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 NOTE 
Suit Up!:  
Favoring Lenders Over Borrowers,  
Eighth Circuit Requires Lawsuit 
Commencement to Effect TILA Rescissions 
Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013) 
TIMOTHY M. GUNTLI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With about two-thirds of Americans, on average, owning their homes,1 
mortgages are big business in the United States.  To protect home loan bor-
rowers, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in the late 1960s 
as a protective measure to ensure that lenders provide material disclosure of 
credit terms so that consumers can borrow responsibly and safely.2  As a 
remedy for a failure of a lender to make such disclosures, borrowers may 
rescind the loan if they do so within three years of the closing.3  Rescission is 
an enormously powerful tool, and in a process where borrowers have little 
control, it remains the “singular source of borrower leverage in a legal and 
economic climate that remains generally inhospitable to homeowners.”4 
Recently, an examination of the language contained in TILA and the re-
lated regulations has centered around a seemingly simple issue: May a bor-
rower exercise the right to rescind simply by sending the lender notice of 
intent to do so, or must the borrower file a lawsuit demanding rescission?  
Because rescission remains the only leverage that a borrower has over a lend-
er in a mortgage transaction, the answer to this question is vitally important to 
borrowers.  Prior to Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., the United States circuit 
courts of appeals had split evenly on the issue.5  Then, in Keiran, the U.S. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Missouri School of Law.  I would like to 
thank Professor Brad Desnoyer for his valuable comments and the staff of the Mis-
souri Law Review for their editorial assistance. 
 1. Table 14: Quarterly Homeownership Rates for the U.S. and Regions: 1965  
to Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013), http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/ 
histtab14.xls. 
 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012); see also infra Part III.A. 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2012). 
 4. Lea Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers’ 
Right of Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171, 172 (2010). 
 5. Compare Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 
2013) (holding that written notice alone is sufficient to rescind), and Gilbert v. Resi-
1
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit tipped the balance in favor of lenders 
when it held that sending notice of intent to rescind to a lender is insufficient 
and that a borrower must instead file suit in order to exercise the right of re-
scission.6  This Note argues that Keiran was decided incorrectly based on 
principles of statutory interpretation, application of legal precedent, and legis-
lative intent.7 
Part II of this Note will discuss the facts and holding of Keiran.  Part III 
will examine the legal background and history of TILA and explain recent 
precedent regarding the specific issue presented in Keiran.  In Part IV, this 
Note will explore the analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions in Kei-
ran.  Finally, Part V concludes this Note by criticizing the court’s analysis in 
the instant decision and contemplating future effects of the decision on bor-
rowers and lenders. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
This appeal arose from two consolidated cases of borrowers, the Keirans 
and the Sobieniaks, attempting to rescind mortgage loans.8  In the Sobieniaks’ 
case, the borrowers, seeking to refinance, executed a promissory note for a 
mortgage loan on March 22, 2007, which was secured by their principal resi-
dence.9  At closing, the Sobieniaks acknowledged receiving two copies of the 
notice of right to cancel (or rescind) the loan but only one copy of the TILA 
disclosure statement.10  On January 15, 2010, less than three years after exe-
cution of the promissory note, the borrowers sent a notice of rescission to the 
lender, claiming a rescission right on grounds that the lender had failed to 
provide two copies of the TILA disclosure at closing.11  On January 29, the 
lender denied the rescission, claiming that the correct number of copies of all 
required documents was provided for the borrowers at closing.12 
On January 14, 2011, more than three years after execution of the  
promissory note, the borrowers filed suit, claiming money damages, rescis-
sion of the loan, and a declaration that the loan was void because the lender 
failed to provide two copies of the TILA disclosure at the closing.13  The   
 
dential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that written 
notice alone is sufficient to rescind), with Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 
1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that mere “written notice to rescind is not 
enough for a consumer to invoke her right to rescission”), and McOmie-Gray v. Bank 
of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that borrower’s 
notice alone is insufficient to exercise right of rescission); see also infra Part III.B. 
 6. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 7. See infra Part V. 
 8. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 724. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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trial court granted summary judgment for the lender, finding, among other 
things, that the borrowers “had no right to rescind because they did not       
file the suit for rescission within the three-year statute of repose contained in 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).”14 
In the Keirans’ case, the borrowers and the lender executed a promisso-
ry note for a mortgage loan in December 2006.15  At closing, the Keirans 
acknowledged receiving two copies of the notice of right to rescind but     
only one copy of the TILA disclosure statement.16  On October 8, 2009,     
less than three years after executing the promissory note, the Keirans sent 
rescission notices to the lender, claiming that they did not receive sufficient 
copies of required TILA disclosures at the closing.17  The lender denied      
the request and, on January 7, 2010, informed the Keirans that there was no 
basis for rescission.18 
On October 29, 2010, the Keirans filed suit against the lender, seeking 
money damages, rescission of the loan, and a declaration that the lender’s 
security interest in the loan was void.19  Like the Sobieniaks, the Keirans al-
leged that rescission was proper because they did not receive, as required by 
statute, more than one copy of the TILA Disclosure Statement at closing.20  
Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment for the lender, 
holding that the three-year statute of repose contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) 
barred the Keirans’ claim for rescission.21 
These cases were consolidated on appeal, and a panel of the Eighth   
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decisions.22  The court held that when a 
borrower seeks to rescind a mortgage loan based on the lender’s failure        
to make required disclosures or provide rescission notices under TILA, a 
borrower must file a suit seeking rescission, rather than merely giving to the 
lender notice of intent to rescind, within three years of the execution of a 
promissory note.23 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Part III.A will discuss the general history and intent of TILA as well as 
one of its specific purposes in assuring meaningful disclosure of terms and 
conditions to borrowers of home mortgage loans.  Then, Part III.B will de-
scribe recent cases decided by various United States circuit courts of appeals 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 724-25. 
 17. Id. at 725. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 730. 
 23. Id. at 728. 
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interpreting TILA and its associated regulations concerning the same issue 
presented in Keiran: May a borrower exercise the right of rescission simply 
by sending notice to the lender of intent to do so, or must the borrower file a 
lawsuit demanding rescission? 
A.  The Truth in Lending Act 
With an underlying interest in protecting consumers and improving 
lending practices,24 TILA was passed in 1968 as one of President Lyndon 
Johnson’s “Great Society” initiatives.25  The enactment of TILA marked the 
beginning of a consumer-protective era, and its “consumer-centric senti-
ments” were meant to shield borrowers from predatory lenders.26  The official 
main purpose of TILA is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so 
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit 
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect 
the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card prac-
tices.”27  In laymen’s terms, TILA makes it possible for consumers to “com-
parison shop for credit,” a feat previously impossible because lenders “had no 
uniform way of calculating interest or determining what [other] charges 
would be included in an interest rate.”28 
To resolve the issue of a lack of uniformity in lenders’ calculations and 
rates, TILA mandates that lenders provide potential borrowers with “specific, 
standardized information about . . . credit transactions in an attempt to both 
(1) increase transparency and competition in the credit markets and (2) pro-
mote the ‘informed use of credit.’”29  Congress authorized the Federal Re-
serve Board to implement TILA,30 and the Board effected this implementa-
tion through Regulation Z.31 
As one of its protections afforded to borrowers, TILA entitles borrowers 
to a three-business-day period within which he or she may rescind the execu-
tion of a mortgage loan on the borrower’s principal dwelling.32  However,     
if the lender fails to provide the borrower with a notice of the right to rescind 
or other material information about the loan during the closing, the right       
to rescind extends to “three years after the date of consummation of the trans-
action or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”33  To exercise 
 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012); see also Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 
681 F.3d 1172, 1179 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)). 
 25. Shepard, supra note 4, at 184. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). 
 28. Shepard, supra note 4, at 184-85. 
 29. Id. at 185 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)). 
 30. Id. at 186. 
 31. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.1(a) (2012). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). 
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the right of rescission, Regulation Z’s complementing provision states        
the following: 
To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor 
of the rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of written commu-
nication.  Notice is considered given when mailed, or when filed for 
telegraphic transmission, or, if sent by other means, when delivered to 
the creditor’s designated place of business.34 
Because TILA was enacted with the purpose of protecting consumers by 
increasing transparency and competition in the credit markets from their pre-
vious levels and by better enabling consumers to compare available credit 
terms, it is remedial in nature, and multiple courts have held that it therefore 
must be construed liberally in favor of borrowers.35 
In addition to being a remedial statute, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has held that section 1635(f) is a statute of repose,36 limiting the right 
of a borrower to assert rescission more than three years after execution of a 
mortgage loan as an affirmative defense when the borrower is a defendant in 
a collection action.37 
In Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, borrowers conceded that they did not 
have a right to an independent action of rescission because they had not made 
any attempt to rescind within three years of their loan’s execution.38  Never-
theless, they claimed that rescission could be asserted as an affirmative de-
fense to the lender’s collection efforts.39  The Supreme Court of the United 
States held that section 1635(f) went “beyond any question whether it limits 
more than the time for bringing a suit, by governing the life of the underlying 
right as well.”40  Reasoning that the statute spoke in terms of a right’s dura-
tion rather than a period within which a suit must be commenced,41 the Court 
concluded that “the Act permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or 
 
 34. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.15(a)(2). 
 35. See, e.g., Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 (11th Cir. 
2004); see also, e.g., Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 725 (8th Cir. 2013); 
Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013); Rosenfield v. 
HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 36. Whereas a statute of limitations is a “law that bars claims after a specified 
period . . . based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or 
was discovered),” a statute of repose “bar[s] any suit that is brought after a specified 
time since the defendant acted . . . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has 
suffered a resulting injury.” Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 441 (4th Cir. 
2013) (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411-12 (1998). 
 38. Id. at 415. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 417. 
 41. Id. 
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otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run.”42  The Court’s deci-
sion in Beach would become a pivotal part of subsequent courts’ rulings on 
whether borrowers are required to file suit or merely provide notice in order 
to effectuate their right to rescind under TILA. 
B.  Recent Precedent Regarding Effective Rescission: 
A Split in Authority 
Prior to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Keiran, four federal courts of 
appeals had split evenly into two camps on the issue of what constitutes ef-
fective rescission.  The Third and Fourth Circuits had held that borrowers 
need only send notice of rescission to their mortgage servicer within three 
years of a loan’s closing to exercise effectively their right to rescind a mort-
gage transaction under TILA,43 but the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had held that 
borrowers must commence a lawsuit for rescission against their mortgage 
servicer within three years of a loan’s closing to exercise effectively their 
right to rescind under TILA.44 
The first case to consider the issue of whether a borrower must file suit 
for rescission rather than merely send notice to a lender was decided in Feb-
ruary 2012 by the Ninth Circuit in McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America Home 
Loans.45  In McOmie-Gray, the Ninth Circuit held that merely sending notice 
to a lender to request rescission of a mortgage loan did not satisfy the re-
quirements of TILA.46  In drawing its conclusion, the court reasoned that “the 
statute and regulations contemplate that a borrower, who by sending notice of 
rescission has ‘advanced a claim seeking rescission,’ will seek a determina-
tion that rescission is proper.”47  Further, relying on Beach’s plain-language 
 
 42. Id. at 419. 
 43. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We 
thus join the Fourth Circuit in holding that an obligor exercises his right of rescission 
by sending the creditor valid written notice of rescission, and need not also file suit 
within the three-year period.”); Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 
276 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Further, we disagree with the Ninth Circuit that a borrower must 
file a lawsuit within the three-year time period to exercise her right to rescind, as 
opposed simply to notifying the creditor.”). 
 44. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We 
agree that the provision of written notice to rescind is not enough for a consumer to 
invoke her right to rescission under TILA . . . .”); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. 
Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Rescission is not automatic upon 
a borrower’s mere notice of rescission . . . .”). 
 45. McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1326. 
 46. Id. at 1327. 
 47. Id. (quoting Large v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 55 (1st   
Cir. 2002)). 
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interpretation, the court held that section 1635(f) simply did not permit a right 
to rescind, “defensively or otherwise,” after the three-year period.48 
In Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, decided in May 2012, the Fourth 
Circuit split from the Ninth, holding that notifying the lender of intent to re-
scind, rather than filing a lawsuit, was sufficient to exercise the right to re-
scind under section 1635(f).49  In reaching its holding, the court noted, just as 
the Ninth Circuit had done, the importance of the plain-meaning rule and 
courts’ duty to apply statutes and regulations as written when the language is 
unambiguous.50  However, the Fourth Circuit found that “[s]imply stated, 
neither 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z says anything about the filing of 
a lawsuit, and we refuse to graft such a requirement upon them.”51  The court 
took care to distinguish the issue of whether a borrower exercised the right to 
rescind (governed by section 1635(f) and Regulation Z) from whether the 
rescission has been completed (requiring the lender to acknowledge the avail-
ability of the right of rescission or the borrower to sue so that the court can 
enforce such a right).52  The court then noted that Beach did not control its 
analysis because Beach addressed only whether a right of rescission had ex-
pired without addressing “the proper method of exercising a right to rescind 
or the timely exercise of that right.”53  Therefore, the court held that even 
though the borrowers had “failed to seek enforcement of their right to rescind 
within the [three-year period],” such a failure did not affect “the fact that they 
[had] exercised their right of rescission within that time.”54 
One month later, in June 2012, the Tenth Circuit countered Gilbert in 
Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, holding that a borrower’s provision of notice 
of intent to rescind to a lender was insufficient to exercise the right of rescis-
sion.55  As the Ninth Circuit had done in McOmie-Gray, the court first noted 
the significance of Beach, drawing attention to its underlying rationale of a 
potential for uncertainty in the chain of title of real estate purchased from 
foreclosure sales.56  Labeling Beach as “dispositive,” the court reiterated that 
TILA imposes a “strict repose period” that “operates to completely extinguish 
the right being claimed after it lapses.”57  Crucial to the court’s holding was 
 
 48. Id. at 1328-29 (quoting Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410,             
419 (1998)). 
 49. Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 277. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 278. 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
 55. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 56. Id. at 1181. 
 57. Id. at 1182. 
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that TILA “establishes a right of action that is generally redressable only 
when a party seeks recognition of it by invoking the power of the courts.”58 
Further, the court, noting that contract rescission is an equitable remedy 
and that the TILA rescission remedy is materially the same as the form of 
rescission generally available for avoidance of voidable contracts, reasoned 
that the purpose of rescission is to “return the parties to the status quo prevail-
ing before the existence of an underlying contract” and that “it is not an ap-
propriate remedy in circumstances where its application would lead to pro-
hibitively difficult (or impossible) enforcement.”59  In a “significant number” 
of cases, the court explained, “the remedial economy of the remedy would be 
jeopardized” if borrowers were allowed to exercise their right to rescission by 
giving notice alone because “the underlying circumstances . . . are likely to 
have changed significantly” when a borrower decides at a later point in time 
to file suit against the lender;60 thus, enforcement would become “costly and 
difficult” in contradiction to the general goal of the rescission remedy.61  Fi-
nally, under a plain-language analysis, the court reasoned that Regulation Z 
established that giving notice to a lender of intent to rescind was a necessary, 
rather than sufficient, requirement.62 
The final decision in the quartet of cases leading up to Keiran came      
in February 2013 in Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services, in which the 
Third Circuit held that borrowers may exercise their right of rescission by 
sending written notice to lenders rather than filing suit.63  Beginning its anal-
ysis with the text of the statute, the court noted that while section 1635     
“explicitly address[es] both how the right of rescission is exercised and when 
the rights and corresponding obligations flowing therefrom are incurred by 
the parties to the loan,” and while Regulation Z “specifies that the obligor 
must notify his lender ‘by mail, telegram, or other means of written commu-
nication,’” neither provision “states that the obligor must also file suit; both 
refer exclusively to written notification as the means by which an obligor 
exercises his right of rescission.”64 
The court then distinguished Beach, noting that it had addressed the is-
sue of whether a borrower who had never taken any action to rescind within 
the three-year period could assert rescission as a defense rather than the issue 
of how such a right of rescission must be exercised in the first place.65  The 
court also made an effort to demonstrate that the phrase from Beach on which 
 
 58. Id. at 1183.  The court remarked in a footnote that a possible exception to 
this general rule would be voluntary allowance of rescission on the part of a lender.  
Id. at 1183 n.8. 
 59. Id. at 1183-84. 
 60. Id. at 1185. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 64. Id. at 258 (quoting 12 C.F.R. §§ 1026.15(a)(2), 1026.23(a)(2) (2012)). 
 65. Id. at 262. 
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the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had relied so heavily66 was actually consistent 
with its own holding that only notice is necessary to exercise the right of re-
scission: “The most that can be gleaned from the oft-quoted statement is that, 
however the right of rescission is to be exercised, it must be done within three 
years.”67  Finally, the court stated that although lenders’ concerns about in-
creased costs and difficulties were not unwarranted, the fact that allowing 
mere notice, rather than the filing of a lawsuit, to exercise the right to rescind 
may be more costly “is not, in and of itself, a reason to disregard the text of 
the statute.”68 
After the decision in Sherzer, the federal appellate courts were split 
evenly as to whether provision of notice was sufficient to make the exercise 
of rescission effective.69  In Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., the Eighth Circuit 
was given an opportunity to tip the scales in favor of either lenders or bor-
rowers in TILA rescission actions.70 
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
In Keiran, the Eighth Circuit held that the filing of a lawsuit is necessary 
to accomplish rescission;71 in so holding, the court relied heavily on Rosen-
field.72  The court offered the following reasons for its conclusion: the nature 
of a statute of repose as a total bar to a cause of action;73 the remedy of con-
tract rescission as a remedial, equitable remedy;74 uncertainties in the chain of 
title that would likely arise if a suit were not filed within the statutory peri-
od;75 and the plain text of the statute (including explication by Beach).76 
Relying heavily on Rosenfield’s interpretation of Beach, the court began 
its opinion by indicating the significance of the general nature of statutes of 
repose, referencing their purpose of “completely extinguish[ing] the right 
 
 66. The Supreme Court of the United States had declared that TILA “permits no 
federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) 
has run.”  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 419 (1998); see also Rosenfield, 
681 F.3d at 1187; McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 67. Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 263. 
 68. Id. at 267. 
 69. The Third and Fourth Circuits had found that written notice alone could 
exercise the right of rescission.  Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261; Gilbert v. Residential Fund-
ing LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012).  The Tenth and Ninth Circuits had found 
that the filing of a lawsuit was necessary to exercise the right of rescission.  Rosen-
field, 681 F.3d at 1182; McOmie-Gray, 667 F.3d at 1327. 
 70. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 71. Id. at 728. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 727. 
 74. Id. at 727-28. 
 75. Id. at 728. 
 76. Id. 
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being claimed after it lapses.”77  The majority then emphasized the underly-
ing rationale of such statutes, explaining that their absolute bar on causes of 
action is “unconcerned with ‘plaintiffs’ diligence’” but instead functions to 
provide would-be defendants with peace of mind once the statutory period 
has passed.78  Therefore, the court held, it was logically consistent with the 
underlying purpose of statutes of repose (i.e., limiting the ability to file an 
action) to require borrowers to file rescission actions within the three-year 
period prescribed by TILA.79 
Next, the court elaborated on the general essence of the remedy of re-
scission.80  Noting that rescission is an equitable remedy designed to put the 
parties in the positions in which they would have been if the contract had 
never been executed, rather than to award parties compensation such as dam-
ages, the court reasoned that such a remedial goal is not effectively achieved 
when rescission is difficult to enforce.81  If a borrower were able to satisfy the 
rescission requirement merely by notifying a lender of her intent to rescind, 
she could leave open the possibility of filing suit on that claim for an indefi-
nite period of time;82 however, if the property were foreclosed upon before 
any such action was filed, the borrower’s notice would act “as a cloud” on the 
lender’s title.83 
Finally, the majority provided a plain-language analysis of TILA.84  Af-
ter acknowledging the language of Regulation Z and the potential interpreta-
tion that notice is sufficient to preserve the right of rescission, the court rea-
soned that while the regulation does outline one requirement of rescission, it 
does not lay out all requirements for successful accomplishment of rescis-
sion.85 The court buttressed this conclusion by reasoning that even though 
Regulation Z does not explicitly require filing suit, “filing suit will certainly 
be necessary to actually accomplish rescission in most cases where rescission 
under TILA is sought.”86 
In her dissent, Judge Diana Murphy opined that the majority’s decision 
was inconsistent with the plain language of TILA and the congressional intent 
behind it, asserting that the majority had broadly construed the Act in favor of 
lenders rather than borrowers.87 
First, and crucially to its reasoning, the dissent drew attention to the 
plain language of TILA, noting that section 1635 requires borrowers to notify 
 
 77. Id. at 727 (quoting Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182 
(10th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. Id. (quoting Rosenfield, 681 F.3d at 1183). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 727-28. 
 83. Id. at 728. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 731 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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lenders of rescission in accordance with Regulation Z and that Regulation Z 
allows for notification to take place by written communication alone.88  Be-
cause the borrowers undisputedly had sent written notification to the lenders 
within three years of execution of the loan, and because of the clarity of the 
statute, the borrowers had properly exercised their right of rescission.89  Fur-
ther, reasoned the dissent, the majority had misplaced its reliance on Beach as 
governing the instant case.90  Beach was different: In that case, the Supreme 
Court of the United States dealt with borrowers who had never sent written 
notice or filed a suit against the lender until more than five years after the 
loan contract had been executed.91  Accordingly, the Court there had decided 
only that the statute of repose barred exercise of the right of rescission after 
three years without deciding how a borrower could properly exercise such a 
right within the three-year period.92 
The dissent next reasoned that although statutes of repose extinguish 
some prescribed rights unless certain action is taken within a given time   
period, such action is not necessarily a lawsuit.93  Rather, the type of action 
required depends on what the statute provides, and TILA clearly allowed 
borrowers to exercise the right of rescission by mere notification.94  The   
dissent reasoned that when Congress had previously chosen to utilize a statute 
of repose to require the filing of a lawsuit in other legislation, it had done     
so explicitly, but TILA contained no language even intimating that a lawsuit 
was required to exercise the right of rescission.95  In the absence of such a 
requirement, the dissent found that the plain language requiring only notice 
was dispositive.96 
Additionally, the dissent noted that section 1635(a), which allows for a 
borrower to rescind within three days of contract execution merely by notify-
ing the lender in writing, was structurally identical to section 1635(f), and 
therefore, there was “no textual reason” to determine that the three-year re-
scission right must be exercised by the filing of suit instead.97  Finally, re-
garding statutory interpretation, the dissent pointed out that section 1635  
consistently contemplated rescission to be the result of actions taken by      
the borrowers and lenders rather than the court.98  In light of an almost-
complete lack of mention of the judiciary in section 1635, the right of rescis-
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 731-32. 
 93. Id. at 732. 
 94. Id. at 733. 
 95. Id. at 732-33. 
 96. Id. at 733. 
 97. Id. (citing Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 264 (3d         
Cir. 2013)). 
 98. Id. 
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sion could be exercised by borrower notification to lenders rather than filing 
of a suit in court.99 
In response to the majority’s concerns that allowing rescission by mere 
notice would grant borrowers a unilateral ability to cloud title for more than 
three years after closing, the dissent reasoned that such concerns were un-
founded because lenders are always free to file a declaratory or quiet title 
action to establish whether any purported exercise of a right of rescission was 
legally valid.100  Further, if filing suit were required to exercise the right of 
rescission, such a filing would still create a cloud on the title that could be 
resolved only by court order or a negotiated agreement between the parties;101 
thus, the rule mandating filing of a lawsuit did not actually solve clouding 
problems as the majority had contemplated.102 
Finally, the dissent pointed out that a litigation-oriented interpretation  
of TILA requiring the filing of suit by borrowers to exercise their right of 
rescission was incongruent with the Act’s purpose because Congress          
had intended for rescission to be a private matter between the parties without 
judicial intervention, as evidenced by extending the time period within   
which a lender must refund a borrower’s money after a borrower exercises his 
right to rescind.103  The dissent then concluded by reasoning that Congress,  
in its discretion, had chosen to protect borrowers by enacting TILA as a re-
medial statute, and as such, its status required a liberal construction in favor 
of borrowers.104 
V.  COMMENT 
This Part begins with a discussion of the court’s interpretation of TILA 
and accompanying regulations and then argues that the majority opinion not 
only disregarded the plain language of the statute but also ignored the legisla-
tive intent underlying it.  Following that argument, Part V.B will elaborate on 
the court’s interpretation of Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, arguing that the 
majority improperly applied that case in Keiran because the issue presented 
had not actually been raised or decided in Beach.  Part V.C then focuses on 
the title-clouding rationale that the majority used to buttress its holding, argu-
ing that such a rationale is unfounded.  Finally, Part V.D offers a discussion 
of the practical effects of Keiran. 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 734. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 735. 
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A.  Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the court’s decision in Keiran is its 
departure from basic principles of statutory interpretation.  As the dissent 
pointed out, when language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court 
needs only to enforce the plain language of the statute without seeking out 
sources of meaning beyond the statute itself.105  However, the majority insist-
ed on reading into the plain language a requirement that is otherwise ab-
sent.106  In reading in the additional requirement, the majority made a conclu-
sory statement that the plain text of the statute requires the filing of a suit 
simply because the section “does not set forth the entirety of things necessary 
to accomplish rescission.”107  However, the majority never actually gave any 
reason why the plain language should be interpreted as requiring a lawsuit 
when the statute is silent about such a requirement.  There is no reason that 
supplying notification to a lender cannot be both necessary and sufficient. 
As justification for imposing the suit-filing requirement, the majority 
posited that the filing of a suit would be necessary to accomplish effective 
rescission in most cases where rescission is sought under TILA.108  Assuming 
for the sake of argument that it is true that filing suit is typically necessary, 
this fact alone is not sufficient to require such a suit to be filed.  The law 
should not require that all borrowers take a certain action simply because 
most of them ultimately will need to do so under similar circumstances.  The 
fact that a lawsuit is likely to be necessary should not require that one be 
filed; such required suits will ultimately result in a waste of time and money 
in situations in which the parties would have privately agreed to rescission 
without legal action.  Further, the majority’s assertion that filing suit is almost 
always ultimately necessary to enforce rescission cannot be taken for granted 
based on the underlying congressional intent for TILA to facilitate dispute 
resolution among private parties without judicial intervention.109 
As the dissent pointed out, “Congress evinced a clear intent that an ideal 
rescission would occur without judicial intervention.”110  Section 1635 con-
tains only two provisions that make reference to the judiciary,111 and neither 
alludes to a suggestion that a court proceeding is necessary to exercise the 
right of rescission.112  By inserting a requirement of commencement of a  
lawsuit where no such filing is required by the plain language of the statute, 
the majority replaced Congress’s intent with its own and placed an unneces-
 
 105. Id. at 731 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Coop v. Frederickson, 545 F.3d 
652, 656 (8th Cir. 2008)). 
 106. Id. at 728 (majority opinion). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 734 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b), (g) (2012). 
 112. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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sary burden on borrowers in spite of TILA’s status as a consumer protection 
statute.  The majority’s disregard of the legislative intent behind this particu-
lar provision is indicative of its overlooking Congress’s general intent in  
enacting TILA. 
As discussed above, TILA was enacted by Congress to provide protec-
tion for borrowers by requiring meaningful disclosures of credit terms;113 as a 
consumer protection statute, courts must interpret TILA broadly in favor of 
consumers.114  Even if the court had found the statute to be ambiguous in 
some way, any such ambiguities should have been resolved in favor of the 
consumer-borrowers.  Given Congress’s specific intent to protect consumers, 
the majority’s construction has troubling implications for future cases brought 
under TILA and other consumer protection statutes: By ignoring the principle 
requiring broad construction in favor of consumers in this case, the majority 
has opened the door for narrow constructions in future cases as well. 
In addition to disregarding classical tenets of plain-language construc-
tion, the majority also ignored authoritative interpretations of TILA. On July 
21, 2011, Congress transferred exclusive authority for the interpretation and 
promulgation of rules regarding TILA from the Federal Reserve System to 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).115  The CFPB, which 
filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Sobieniaks, has taken the official posi-
tion that borrowers need only notify their lenders of the rescission right with-
in three years of obtaining a loan.116  In light of the official stance taken by 
the CFPB and the bureau’s urging the court to adopt its interpretation, it is 
disconcerting that the majority flatly refused to apply such an interpretation 
after mentioning that it was “not unmindful” of the CFPB’s position.117 
By summarily disregarding the CFPB’s argument despite the bureau’s 
express interpretive authority, the majority divested the CFPB of its legisla-
tively-granted power.  Although the majority may have disagreed with the 
CFPB’s contention, and although the CFPB’s interpretation may not have 
been binding on the court, the majority should have paid great deference to 
the CFPB in light of the bureau’s congressionally-granted authority and 
TILA’s status as a consumer protection statute.  If Congress’s intent were 
ever an issue for the court in interpreting the plain language of TILA, any 
such doubts should have been resolved unmistakably by the entry of the 
CFPB as an amicus. 
 
 113. See supra Part III.A; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012). 
 114. Rand Corp. v. Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 115. Brief of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 3, Keiran, 720 F.3d 721 [hereinafter Brief of the 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau] (No. 12–1053), 2012 WL 1514738. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728. 
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B.  Misapplication of Legal Precedent 
Aside from its disregard for rules of statutory construction, the majority 
also incorrectly applied legal precedent in reaching its conclusion.  The ma-
jority relied heavily on the Beach decision (and Rosenfield’s interpretation of 
it) and its holding that TILA does not permit a right to rescind, defensively or 
otherwise, after the three-year period has run.118  However, Beach concerned 
a different issue than did Keiran: The Beach Court was concerned with 
whether a right of rescission was available after the three-year period had run 
without the borrowers either notifying the lender or filing a suit.119  By con-
trast, the Keirans’ and Sobieniaks’ cases were concerned with how to exercise 
the right of rescission in the first place.120  Unlike the Beach borrowers, the 
Keirans and Sobieniaks had actually notified their respective lenders within 
the three-year period.121 
Though the Keiran majority found otherwise, it does not necessarily 
logically follow that Beach’s total ban on rights to rescission applied to the 
present case.  If the borrowers in Beach had actually sent notification to their 
lenders within the three-year period, the Supreme Court’s holding would have 
laid down a rule applicable to the instant case (i.e., whether such notification 
effectively exercised the right of rescission).  However, because the issue was 
never actually addressed by the Supreme Court in Beach, its holding barring a 
right to rescission need not, and should not, be applied in the instant case. 
C.  Logical Inconsistency 
Aside from the legal inconsistencies in the majority opinion, the opinion 
is also logically faulty because it cited an implausible theoretical problem of 
title clouding.  The majority made much ado about the potential influx of title 
clouding issues if notification alone were sufficient to exercise the right of 
rescission, asserting that borrowers could then “unilaterally impair[]” a lend-
er’s security interest.122  However, what the majority opinion seems to over-
look is that even if borrowers were required to file suit to rescind, such a suit 
would have the exact same effect (i.e., title cloud creation) under TILA.123  
Further, if notice were sufficient on its own to exercise the right to rescind, 
then a lender’s interest would not truly be unilaterally impaired because the 
lender could still file an action for declaratory or quiet title relief.124  A lender 
would have its interest impaired only if it sat idly after receiving notice of 
 
 118. Id. at 726-29. 
 119. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411-12 (1998). 
 120. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 732 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Sherzer v. Homestar 
Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 121. Id. at 724-25 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id. at 728. 
 123. Id. at 734 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2012)). 
 124. Id. 
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rescission.  Therefore, the court was ultimately presented with this question: 
If one party (i.e., either the borrower or the lender) will inevitably have to file 
suit in order to resolve an issue of rescission and clear title, should that onus 
be placed on the borrower or the lender?  Despite an unmistakable imperative 
to construe TILA in favor of borrowers as a consumer protection statute, the 
majority placed this burden on the borrowers. 
D.  Practical Implications 
The court’s decision in Keiran raises a host of practical implications for 
home loan borrowers, including that a typical borrower will not know that the 
filing of a lawsuit is required to exercise the right to rescind effectively.  The 
CFPB has produced model forms for lenders to use in the closing of a loan, 
and such forms contain information about borrowers’ right of rescission.125  
For example, Form H-8(A) Rescission Model Form (General), which reads, 
“Your Right to Cancel This Loan” centered at the top of the form, gives di-
rections on how to cancel the loan: the borrower is instructed to submit the 
bottom portion of the form to the lender named on the form.126  Conspicuous-
ly absent from the form is any instruction for borrowers to file a suit, initiate 
other conduct involving the courts, or take any other action whatsoever.127  A 
typical borrower, unsophisticated in the study of law, or even a reasonable 
attorney well-lettered in the law, would have no reason to think that he or she 
is required to file a suit in addition to notifying the lender of rescission.  By 
requiring the filing of a suit, the court potentially allows lenders to prey on, or 
at least unjustly benefit from, borrowers’ understandable ignorance, and bor-
rowers are penalized for following the plain language of the statute.  In light 
of TILA’s consumer protection purpose, this result is exactly the opposite of 
what Congress intended. 
Additionally, by requiring the filing of a suit to exercise the right of re-
scission, the court essentially nullifies the notice provision of the statute, ren-
dering it meaningless.  It is a basic principle of civil procedure that parties to 
a lawsuit have a right to receive notice of that lawsuit.128  If borrowers file a 
lawsuit, then they are already obligated to provide notice to the lenders as a 
requirement of such a suit.  Thus, Keiran renders TILA’s rescission notice 
provision redundant.  Such an interpretation, rendering the entire provision 
mere surplusage (i.e., “of no consequence”), should be avoided as a matter of 
statutory interpretation canon.129  At best, then, providing notice to the lender 
becomes a mere formality.  However, given that notice is expressly men-
 
 125. Brief of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 115, at 6. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 129. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994). 
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tioned in the statute, whereas commencement of a lawsuit is not, it is incon-
sistent with the statute’s language that notice be merely a formality.130 
Finally, requiring borrowers to file suits in order to rescind also serves 
to add additional cases to an already overburdened court system.  If borrow-
ers were required only to notify lenders in order to rescind, then the lenders 
and borrowers would have an incentive to bargain amongst themselves as to 
whether a rescission was effective before resorting to the courts for assis-
tance.  This type of private negotiation, free of unnecessary judicial interven-
tion, is what Congress intended when it enacted TILA.131  In contrast, by 
requiring court action, Keiran imposes additional costs onto borrowers that 
they otherwise would not incur if commencement of a suit were not required.  
Such additional costs may be especially burdensome for borrowers attempt-
ing to rescind a home loan because the very reason they are requesting rescis-
sion is likely that they are already in desperate financial straits.  To be sure, 
the filing of a suit will ultimately be necessary in some cases to resolve the 
issue of whether a borrower is actually entitled to have a claimed rescission 
enforced.  But needlessly subjecting all borrowers to that requirement as a 
blanket obligation is detrimental to too great a number of borrowers.  This 
argument is buttressed even further by the fact that TILA is meant to protect 
consumers, and any debatable requirements should be resolved in favor of 
borrowers rather than lenders.132 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Eighth Circuit tipped the balance in favor of lenders in Keiran, but 
the issue with which it dealt remains closely contested; indeed, even other 
members of the same circuit believe that the case was wrongly decided.133  
Nevertheless, in the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, borrowers will be re-
quired to file suit within the statutory time period in order to accomplish re-
scission unless the Supreme Court of the United States rules otherwise134 or 
 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2012). 
 131. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 2013)  (Murphy,  
J., dissenting). 
 132. See, e.g., id. at 725 (majority opinion); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 
707 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 
1179-80 (10th Cir. 2012); Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1065 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
 133. See, e.g., Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092,    
1093-94 (8th Cir. 2013) (deciding a case per curiam in favor of the lender on essen-
tially the same facts as Keiran with two judges concurring, each noting that he would 
have decided the case in favor of the borrower if the court were not bound by the 
precedent set in Keiran). 
 134. As this Note goes to press, the Court is deciding whether it will grant the 
Keiran plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari. See Search, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/13-705.htm (last 
visited July 13, 2014). 
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Congress expressly amends TILA.135  In the meantime, the CFPB must con-
sider requiring lenders to include in their disclosures at closing an explicit 
statement that the commencement of a suit is necessary to exercise the right 
to rescind in some states. 
Critics of Keiran are likely to decry the decision as anti-consumer judi-
cial overstepping while supporters will praise it as reasonable protection for 
lenders against uncertainty of title and exorbitant costs that flow from such 
uncertainty. Only time will reveal whether the next Circuit Court to take up a 
Keiran-style case will once again even the balance or push it even further in 
the direction of lenders. 
 
 
 135. See Keiran, 720 F.3d 721; Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 
(10th Cir. 2012); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
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